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‘‘The statistics are well known.’’ After this first sentence of the book, and some examples
of the statistics, an equally well known question follows: ‘‘Why does so much human
misery exist in a world that possesses enough resources to assure a healthy and comfortable
life for all world citizens?’’ The next question takes us to ethics: ‘‘Is it fair?’’ The rhetoric
coming from policy makers is clear enough, the authors note: it is unfair and something
must be done. But the rhetoric is followed by insufficient action. The question then
becomes how ethics may help to close this gap: ‘‘We hope that the book will help develop
a shared vision that combines ethics and economics.’’
How ethics may help in the struggle against poverty and hunger is the main search of
this book. During this search, the collection is looking for appropriate policies, as the
subtitle says, thus making us look forward to specific ways to proceed. A distinguished
collection of authors from different backgrounds approaches the problem from the per-
spective of ethics, religion, international law, economics, and the world of NGOs, while in
the second half the book zooms in on policies of food and agriculture: GM crops, agri-
cultural subsidies and tariff walls, and food safety standards.
It is a wonderful development that ethics is turning global, gives priority to the most
urgent global problems, and wonders how it can help. The search is not an easy one, as this
book richly illustrates.
The statistics may be well known, they are nevertheless present throughout the book:
many chapters give data and comparisons from which moral perplexity follows almost
automatically. ‘‘Absolute poverty is estimated to affect about 1.2 billion people.’’ ‘‘46% of
the world’s population lives below the US$ 2 a day poverty line.’’ ‘‘At least 140 million
children in the developing world are seriously undernourished.’’ ‘‘In 2003, 625 people were
killed in terrorist attacks, while some 10 million died of starvation.’’
A lively way to imagine inequality statistics is through the ‘‘Parade of Dwarfs (and a
few Giants)’’, a graphic metaphor devised by the Dutch economist Jan Pen in the early
1970s. In this image, people’s height is proportional to their income. All people are lined
up in order of height, and everyone marches by in a 1-h parade, the smallest at the front.
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Pen’s parade, which covered only the UK, starts underground (the marchers suffer losses)
and continues for 20 min with marchers who are so small as to be invisible. After half an
hour dwarfs are marching by in seemingly endless numbers. Only at 12 min before the end
we see people of average height. In the last few minutes, giants loom up (that’s us, more or
less), while in the very last seconds, a few participants rise up for miles. Richard Gilbert
opens his chapter (on globalization and religions) with this parade, and continues with
global data of today: ‘‘The richest 1% of people in the world receives as much as the
bottom 57%.’’ And ‘‘to add to the perplexity’’: most of the growth of the world population
will be in the poorest countries.
The moral perplexity and feelings of urgency and frustration are voiced in many ways,
like the statistics, and here, too, we get global comparison: ‘‘We know that half the world’s
population are living on one or two dollars a day, while the middle classes of affluent
nations enjoy standards of living that feature-and increasingly revolve around-orgiastic
hedonism and consumerism.’’ (Lou Marinoff, p. 29) In response to this situation, a firm
moral answer has long been with us, again in a paper stemming from the early 1970’s,
Peter Singer’s ‘‘Famine, Affluence and Morality.’’ Its central principle is cited in several
chapters: ‘‘If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without
thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance, we ought to do it.’’
Pinstrup-Andersen himself is one of the authors who cite Singer’s principle, along with
the fact that the rule is clearly not followed even remotely. For the failure to apply the
principle, there are several possible explanations, Pinstrup-Andersen suggests; the
‘‘obvious one’’ being that people who are far away from us are less significant. But he does
not pursue such explanations (something I will return to). Morally, there is no excuse for
inaction, and frustration and cynicism about the ‘‘rhetoric-action’’ gap color the chapter.
‘‘The lack of action is accompanied by much rhetoric, plans, targets and promises. The
most cynical of these promises and agreements is undoubtedly the United Nations’ Dec-
laration that freedom from hunger is a basic human right. It is cynical because it is not
empowered with any means to enforce it.’’
For a way out, Pinstrup-Andersen relies on self-interest, since in the globalized world
problems of the poor very soon become our own problems, through lack of markets,
terrorism, illegal immigration, contagious diseases, etc. Yet even this way out is not
working as it should, and again several possible explanations are offered briefly: lack of
shared vision, short time horizons, incident-driven media attention, lack of understanding
of economics.
Lou Marinoff, in the next chapter, describes humans as thoroughly self-regarding, short
sighted and rapacious predators (rather out of tune with the present popularity of Frans de
Waal’s message that empathy and cooperation are just as ingrained in human nature).
Morality, writes Marinoff, arises mainly in favorable, village-like circumstances in which
humans are knitted together by a spirit of community. Such circumstances are not char-
acteristic for our world, where community is superseded by technology. Marinoff discusses
the usual ethical theories, though he does not really appear to believe in their power. While
the most recent branch of moral discourse, which centers on human rights, may represent
some of humanity’s best hopes, he says, it also highlights our worst despair. For example,
despite whatever right to equality, humans are born extremely unequal. The burning
question is not the precise ins and outs of some hypothetical equality, but whether
humanity finds ways to overcome the extreme and debilitating inequalities in the world.
Given the present state of the world, the human population curve, depleted natural
resources, and on and on, the 21st century is likely to witness unimaginable horrors.
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So far, ethics does not seem to offer much: Pinstrup-Andersen thinks we should rely on
self-interest, though that hardly seems to help either. Marinoff is even more pessimistic.
Yet, he is right that human rights are now at the center of human hopes. The author who is
cited even more often than Peter Singer is Amartya Sen, who in 1981, in his Poverty and
Famine, wrote that the emphasis should not be on food availability (there is enough food)
but on people’s entitlements, to food and other goods. Such entitlement implies the
capability of people to purchase food, and this requires democracy, Sen argued. This
approach has now widely been assimilated in a human rights approach to development that
has replaced (pure) utilitarianism: we should not just look at the outcomes; the means also
count heavily. The enthusiasm about a human rights approach is reflected in Mary Rob-
inson’s foreword, where she points out that through human rights we can not only open up
new avenues but also draw on legal tools. The big challenge is now to make these legal
tools effective. Clearly, rights can be effective only when they correlate with duties that
can be enforced. Asbjørn Eide’s chapter on the human rights approach illustrates that this
amounts to a long and arduous struggle. He describes various milestones in the interna-
tional recognition of the right to adequate food. But while ‘‘an impressive set of legal
standards’’ is now available, the main problem is that it is mainly ‘‘soft law,’’ which is to
say that there are no enforcement mechanisms.
In the next chapter, Urban Jonsson invites us to appreciate the UN system of human
rights as one of the most positive manifestations of globalization. He translates the
‘‘rhetoric-action’’ gap into a gap between theory and practice and proposes that it can be
closed through human rights, which provide Sen’s entitlements with the correlative duties
and yield a view in which human rights and democracy are intimately connected and
interdependent. Jonsson argues that from a human rights perspective, the Millennium
Development Goals are still too outcome-oriented. With such conventional goal-oriented
development efforts, the rhetoric-action gap will not disappear, he thinks; a rights based
approach will be needed. But while Jonsson makes it very clear that human rights point in
wonderful directions, as a ‘‘theory,’’ he does not clearly point out how, in practice, they are
superior in closing the theory-practice gap.
Yet there are success stories in the world; there are countries where sustained effort has
led to reduction, in some cases spectacular reduction, of hunger and poverty. Sartaj Aziz
looks at lessons that can be learned from seven countries: China, Korea, Vietnam,
Malaysia, Chile, Uganda, and Tunesia. All these countries had an average rate of economic
growth of at least 3% in the 1990s. But economic growth alone is not enough. The
contribution of this growth to poverty reduction is greater in countries that care for the
productivity and trade conditions of their farmers. Further, the countries achieved macro-
economic stability through fiscal discipline, and they invested in education, health, and
infrastructure. They had strong leadership that succeeded in reducing violence. They had
programs and policies to target less-developed regions and groups, and policies for
reducing income disparities. Last but not least, they had strategies for the decentralization
of responsibilities to local levels. Such strategies worked better when poor people were
mobilized into community organizations. Empowerment and rights are again important,
but the chapter also pictures how successful policies are enormously diverse and practical,
and sometimes squarely outcome-oriented rather than human rights based. After all, the
most impressive reduction of hunger is taking place in China. Human rights protagonists
do not always seem to acknowledge this.
It is impossible, in a review, to do justice to all the contributions in a book like this,
where there are so many different approaches. There are two chapters on religious attitudes
to poverty and hunger, which both note that religions, while zooming in on individual
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attitudes, tend to neglect power structures. There is a chapter about hunger from an NGO
perspective that affirms the rights-based approach. A chapter on equality as a controversial
ideal in economic contexts pictures the extreme inequalities in the world. This brings to
mind Marinoff’s sigh that in a world where the least off are not living a little less com-
fortably, but die, the burning question is not hypothetical equality but how the worst
inequalities can be remedied. Also, there are two chapters on GM food, both expressing
great frustration with the GM debate and its huge amounts of repetition and polarization.
Both chapters take detailed looks at the claim that GM is needed to solve world hunger and
that this overrides other ethical concerns. One chapter (by Peter Sandøe and Kathrine
Madsen) concludes that there are a lot of other and much more obvious ways in which
hunger and suffering can be prevented, and that it may be time to change the focus to these
other ways. The second chapter (by Paul Thompson) concludes that GM is a valid tool for
addressing world hunger, but that its proponents have poisoned the debate by not treating
the opponents respectfully.
The chapters illustrate the widespread fatigue with GM debates. But the hopeful shift in
the debate that can be witnessed these years, from GM itself to the wider issues of
corporate power and intellectual property, is absent from the book.
The chapter on ‘‘the ethics and economics of changing behavior’’ looks at institutional
incentives for change, and considers how food ethics could be strengthened. It wonders, for
instance, whether the medical institutionalizing of ethics (with its oaths and codes and
committees) could be transplanted to the domain of food. Codes of food ethics have only
been very modestly successful so far, but the introduction of a ‘‘Hippocratic oath’’ for food
actors should be considered, the authors think. Yet they also note that ‘‘getting more
ethical’’ in the food domain will not necessarily lead to the end of hunger. Ethics may just
as well focus on other and more marginal improvements.
This latter concern is the central worry of the chapter on food safety standards. Food
safety is a valid concern, of course, but the raising of standards is heavily dominated by the
rich countries and tends to escalate, largely without taking the effects for poor countries
into account. Aflatoxin is a well known and relatively well researched example, where
presumably marginal health gain in Europe led to great (it is disputed how great) loss of
export revenues in Africa. It is one of the rare cases where attempts have at least been made
to evaluate the distribution of costs and benefits. Such evaluations are a necessary step on
the way to a more inclusive moral approach to food safety.
In the course of the book, many policies are recommended in the struggle against
poverty and hunger, varying from investments in education and healthcare to the
replacement of meat eating with vegetarianism. Often, doing good is primarily a matter of
dismantling the bad, and one set of notoriously bad institutions is mentioned again and
again and again throughout the chapters: agricultural subsidies and tariff walls. They
greatly add to global poverty, they are greatly unjust and they should urgently be reformed,
everybody agrees. Two chapters deal with the question: how? One (by Tutweiler and
Straub) takes it that open trade is the key determinant of economic growth, and that
economic growth is the only path to the end of poverty. It puts its hopes on removing trade-
distorting policies of rich and poor countries alike, with flanking measures to prevent short
term disadvantages for poor countries. The other chapter (by Devinder Sharma), which
describes how the rich countries are misusing open trade agreements for their own benefit,
argues that the only morally acceptable way forward is to acknowledge the need for
national food sovereignty and the right of every country to protect its own agriculture.
Further, developing countries should be allowed to restore restrictions and tariffs, and the
human right to food should be the basis of a specific multilateral effort against hunger.
392 C. van der Weele
123
These chapters illustrate the complexity of policy issues. About the harmfulness of
OECD agricultural policy, authors could not agree more. Yet, when it comes to solutions,
no crystal clear picture emerges. It is not easy to get a grip on the issues and on top of that,
the world is changing all the time. Since the book was written, a big food crisis as well as a
big credit crisis struck. The crises have increased the amount of hungry people in the
world. They have strengthened many countries’ fears about being dependent on other
countries. Mistrust of complete liberalization has only increased, and finding a balance
between justifiable protection and distorting tariffs and dumping is more urgent but per-
haps more difficult than ever. Meanwhile, as usual, billions of euros that had been
promised by the rich countries in response to the food crisis have not been forthcoming.
In the final chapter, the editors return to the main question of the book: how ethics may
help in these struggles. Noting that theoretical ethics is a field of deep disagreement, the
role they see for academic debate is mainly one of clarification and the unearthing of
assumptions. For example, the difference between utilitarian and deontological lines of
reasoning still is worth pointing out in many contexts. The book has been fulfilling this
task: several chapters contain a presentation of the different traditions in ethics, and how
they are present in development contexts. The clearest illustration is perhaps that the
dominant utilitarian approach has been ‘‘added on,’’ as the authors say, by Sen’s theory of
entitlements, or capabilities. They could as well have said that Sen’s theory provided a
bridge to the eternal rival, deontology, with human rights now increasingly at the center of
attention in contexts of development. Through international law, rights have become the
focal point of a system of global consensus. International law is still a long way from being
enforceable, and may still be dominated by powerful countries, in short, it is far from
perfect. But there is no alternative, say the editors, since ‘‘it is necessary to operate with a
shared ethical vision and binding minimum of ethical standards’’ (p. 317). What we see is
that, in the movement to consensus, ethics becomes law. But enforceability of international
law is still a major challenge. And here, the authors say, picking up their earlier theme, the
problem is not lack of agreement, but lack of motivation.
Lack of motivation makes for the gap between ‘‘rhetoric’’ and action that they noted at
the beginning of the book and with which they now close it. They propose that ethics may
play a role here by providing ‘‘coordination of action.’’ For example, ethics can bring out
the ethical assumptions in policy options, thus helping to integrate ethical consideration
into economic and political deliberation. Also, it should be analyzed why words are not
followed by action, with the central goal of promoting new action. They are skeptical of
the institutionalization of ethics (through oaths and codes etcetera), instead they put their
hope on open and respectful debate.
The authors are very tentative here, and I think they rightly hesitate, for there is
something strange about this proposal. Clearly, ethics is good at unearthing assumptions. In
its academic form, it can clarify disagreements, in its consensus-seeking form it has been
pointing the way to international law. Yet even consensus does not seem to be enough for
sufficient action and we are told that ethics can also lead the way to a greater motivation.
But what makes the authors think so? If motivation were a matter of ethics, should not the
overwhelming urgency of the moral challenge, and Singer’s powerful arguments, long
have done the work? They haven’t, and perhaps we should not be surprised, because
motivation is not a mere matter of arguments; it involves our emotions, our intuitions, our
deep-seated tendencies. It involves many things that in this book have been noted in
passing, only to be left behind immediately: our tendency to prioritize the short term and
the nearby, to conform to our environments, to have short attention spans, etcetera. Much
work in these areas has been and is done by moral and social psychologists, as well as
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behavioral economists. A picture emerges from these disciplines of people as extremely
sensitive to the characteristics of their situation. From this perspective, an important
question becomes how we can nudge our poor situation-dependent selves into doing good,
and institutionalized ethics might be far more helpful than the editors of this book seem to
think. I suspect that concerning our lack of motivation, it is not ethics but these empirical
disciplines that are going to be most helpful. At the very least, ethics should seek their
assistance, as it has not done in this book.
One of the good things of globalization is the emergence of a global perspective. The
inequalities that emerge in this perspective are ghastly, but they should be confronted and it
is a hopeful development that ethics is increasingly doing so. The effort in this book to find
out how ethics can help has yielded a rich collection of data, views, and insights, but does
not fully convince in the kinds of help it offers. A more pragmatic message is hidden below
the surface, which is the ‘‘all hands on deck’’ view that help is needed from empirical
motivation disciplines.
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